# \*\*\*1NC Section\*\*\*

## 1NC Surveillance DA v.1

#### Uniqueness – the government has very little knowledge of gun ownership due to no widespread surveillance or documentation. Kirkham 2k12:

Chris Kirkham. “Private Gun Sale Loophole Creates Invisible Firearms Market, Prompts Calls For Reform.” 21 December 2012. Accessed 16 December 2015. Web. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/21/private-gun-sales-sandy-hook\_n\_2347420.html SHSBR

Both incidents point to a major loophole in the nation's system of regulating firearms, experts say: **Private parties can buy** and sell **guns** in many parts of the country **with** little or **no scrutiny from** state and federal **authorities. Nearly 40 percent of** gun **transactions** in America **occur through** so-called **private party sales**, creating a secondary firearms market that is **largely invisible. More than three-quarters of states have no laws requiring background checks or documentation during private** party **sales**, increasing the risk of weapons falling into the hands of convicted felons, juveniles or those who are mentally ill. As lawmakers in Washington examine gun control measures in the wake of last week's school massacre in Connecticut, many advocates and researchers are pushing to extend federal regulations requiring background checks and registrations to private gun sales. "Fixing this would be one of the single most important things we could do to address overall gun violence," said David Kennedy, director of the Center for Crime Prevention and Control at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York. "A lot of people don't understand that this is the way the world works. It means that people who everybody agrees shouldn't get guns have little trouble getting guns." **Under the current system**, federal **law** on gun purchases **extends only to the first point of sale**. Federally licensed firearms dealers are required to perform background checks on prospective buyers to screen out those with felony records, a history of domestic violence or mental illness and several other categories. Dealers are also required to keep detailed records of customers. On private party sales, none of those restrictions apply under federal rules. States come up with their own laws governing the secondary gun market, and the restrictions vary widely, leaving an uneven patchwork of regulations from state to state. A handful of states, including California and Rhode Island, require universal background checks for all private party transactions. If someone wanted to purchase from an unlicensed seller at a gun show or anywhere else, he or she would have to go to a federally licensed seller to certify the transaction: the licensed dealer would have to perform a background check before the sale could go through and keep a record of the transfer. Other states, including Illinois, require that sellers register the transaction with the state, though they don't require background checks for all private sales (Illinois requires background checks at gun shows). States such as Hawaii require all gun purchasers, including in the private market, to do a background check and obtain a gun license, which lasts for 10 days. **The vast majority of states have no regulations** whatsoever **on private gun sales**, except for vague statutes that prohibit "knowingly" selling firearms to someone who is a criminal or has mental health problems. Experts argue that the laws create incentives for buyers and sellers in private transactions to find out as little as possible about one another. "Everybody understands how the game is played: the seller never asks any questions," said Dr. Garen Wintemute, who has researched the gun market as director of the Violence Prevention Research Program at the University of California-Davis Health System. "At a gun show the sign on the table says 'private sale,' and everybody knows exactly what that means. It means no waiting period, no background check, no questions asked, cash and a handshake, and you're gone." In a state such as California, where background checks and registration transfers are required on all private transactions, advocates say the law holds the seller accountable. If a gun was recovered at a crime scene and traced back to the seller, instead of the criminal, the seller could be held liable for an illegal gun sale. But in states where there are lenient laws for private gun sales, critics argue that **authorities have very little leverage**.

#### Link Double-Bind – Any gun ban will have some noncompliance – either (a) that means no solvency or (b) that leads to government surveillance of owners. Surveillance would be a necessary component of a ban. Sutter:

John A. Sutter. “How Will They Confiscate Your Guns?”http://www.keepandbeararms.com/newsarchives/XcNewsPlus.asp?cmd=view&articleid=327

For decades **I have heard gun owners claim that the government would never be able to confiscate** our **firearms** because the government would lose too many men. The implication being, of course, that gun owners would actively resist confiscation, even to the point of shooting back. But I believe **this thinking is outdated** and doesn’t align very well with reality. But before you tell me how big your honor guard in Hell will be when that day comes, **let’s think about how the government could really do it**. **Suppose**, for the sake of argument, **the government bans** all civilian possession of **firearms** at the end of this month. Congress passes a total ban and the President cuts his own re-election throat by signing it. **Gun owners get some grace period to turn them in**, even beyond the deadline, **without being charged with a crime. If we use Australia and Britain as examples there will still be a significant number of firearms that are not turned in. Some estimates put the Australian turn-in at less than 25%** and **the British faired only** about **28%. But Australians and the British have long been used to obeying almost every gun control law. Not** so the **Americans. When laws are passed that we don’t like, we bite**. We scratch. We vote. So here we sit after the guns have been collected and the amnesties have run out. Now what? Send out the personnel carriers, swat and shock troops to seize the guns from those militia “terrorists” who refused to turn them in? Don’t be silly. **The government has lots of records about you**. If you purchased a firearm since 1968, chances are that they have some record of it somewhere. Most likely, **it will take quite some time for them to compile all the serial numbers of “surrendered” guns** (surrendered essentially at gunpoint) **and cross off the ones you turned in. It’ll take more time for them to attempt to “clean up” their data**. Say, about two years, maybe three. Add to that the hordes of people keypunching in hundreds of thousands of sales and registration records from hundreds of gun stores forced out of business. **At some point the government decides they have** something approaching **a “good” database of unaccounted-for guns**. The next thing you’ll get from the government is an official looking notice that they think you still have a firearm. **Their information will probably include all the information from registration forms, right down to the serial number. That notice will tell you that you’re in violation of the law, subject to prosecution and imprisonment. It will give you some period of time to surrender** the gun. **It will also give you a very limited number of days to return the form** with an explanation of why you don’t have the gun, any proof you have, and your signature that the gun was lawfully disposed of. For many people the idea that the government “knows” they didn’t turn in that pistol or rifle and they have the detailed information about it will be enough to get them to surrender the gun. Some people will ignore the letter, others will scrawl a note that “I sold this in 1982 in a private sale”. After some time, the government will figure out how many guns are still out there and what the “compliance rate” is with the gun ban. More importantly, they’ll start sorting their database by the number of guns someone supposedly has “unaccounted”.

#### Impact - Surveillance is oppressive, turning the self into an electronic object characterized by data. This forms the foundation for discriminatory elimination. Giroux 2k14:

Giroux, Henry. [One of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public pedagogy, cultural studies, youth studies, higher education, media studies, and critical theory. Written more than 60 books; published more than 400 papers; in 2002 Routledge named Giroux as one of the top fifty educational thinkers of the modern period.] “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State." Truth Out. [nonprofit organization dedicated to providing independent news and commentary on a daily basis. Accepts no advertising or corporate backing — “bias free”] 10 Feb. 2014. Web. 27 Dec. 2015. <http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state>.

**Surveillance feeds on** the related notions of **fear** and delusion. **Authoritarianism** in its contemporary manifestations, as evidenced so grippingly in Orwell's text, no longer depends on the raw displays of power but instead **has become omniscient in a culture of control in which** the most **cherished notions of agency collapse** into unabashed narcissistic exhibitions and confessions of the self, serving as willing fodder for the spying state. The self has become not simply the subject of surveillance but a willing participant and object. Operating off the assumption that some individuals will not willingly turn their private lives over to the spying state and corporations, the NSA and other intelligence agencies work hard to create a turnkey authoritarian state in which **the** "electronic **self" becomes** public **property**. Every space is now enclosed within the purview of an authoritarian society that attempts to govern the entirety of social life. As Jonathan Schell points out: Thanks to Snowden, we also know that unknown volumes of like information are being extracted from Internet and computer companies, including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. The first thing to note about these data is that a mere generation ago, they did not exist. They are a new power in our midst, flowing from new technology, waiting to be picked up; and power, as always, creates temptation, especially for the already powerful. Our cellphones track our whereabouts. Our communications pass through centralized servers and are saved and kept for a potential eternity in storage banks, from which they can be recovered and examined. Our purchases and contacts and illnesses and entertainments are tracked and agglomerated. If we are arrested, even our DNA can be taken and stored by the state. Today, **alongside each one of us, there exists a second, electronic self, created in part by us, in part by others. This other self has become** de facto public **property**, owned chiefly by immense data-crunching corporations, which use it for commercial purposes. Now government is reaching its hand into those corporations for its own purposes, creating a brand-new domain of the state-corporate complex. Social cynicism and societal indifference accelerate a broken culture in which reason has been replaced by consumer-fed hallucinatory hopes.9 **Surveillance and its** accompanying **culture of fear now produce subjects that revel in being watched, turning the** practice if not the **threat posed by surveillance into** just **another condition for performing the self**. Every human act and behavior is now potential fodder for YouTube, Facebook or some other social network. Privacy has become a curse, an impediment that subverts the endless public display of the self. Zygmunt Bauman echoes this sentiment in arguing that: These days, it is not so much the possibility of a betrayal or violation of privacy that frightens us, but the opposite: shutting down the exits. **The area of privacy turns into a site of incarceration, the owner of private space being condemned** and doomed to stew in his or her own juice; forced into a condition marked by an absence of avid listeners eager to wring out and tear away the secrets from behind the ramparts of privacy, **to put them on public display and make them** everybody's shared **property** and a property everybody wishes to share.10 **Everything that moves is monitored, along with information that is endlessly amassed** and stored by private and government agencies. **No one**, it seems, **can escape** the tentacles of the NSA or the spy agencies that are scouring mobile phone apps for personal data and intercepting computer and cellphone shipments to plant tracking devices and malware in them.11 Surveillance is now global, reaching beyond borders that no longer provide an obstacle to collecting information and spying on governments, individuals, prominent politicians, corporations and pro-democracy protest groups. The details of our daily lives are not only on full display but are being monitored, collected and stored in databanks waiting to be used for commercial, security or political purposes. At the same time, the right to privacy is eagerly given up by millions of people for the wonders of social networking or the varied seductions inspired by consumer fantasies. **The loss of** privacy, **anonymity and confidentiality** also **has had the adverse effect of providing the basis for** what Bauman and David Lyons call **the undemocratic process of "social sorting," in which different populations are subject to differential treatment extending from being protected by the state to being killed by drone attacks** launched under the auspices of global surveillance and state power.

## 1NC Surveillance DA v.2

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## Turns Case - Capitalism

#### This turns case - surveillance is capitalist domination. Rotering 2k13:

(Frank Rotering is an independent economic and political thinker who lives near Vancouver, Canada.  He has no affiliation with any university or organization, and is therefore free to address the ecological crisis without institutional or intellectual restrictions.  “NSA Surveillance and Capitalist Power” Contrationism.org <http://contractionism.org/2013/11/nsa-surveillance-and-capitalist-power-2/> 7-14-15)

In May, 2013 Edward Snowden, a contractor working with the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), leaked information about the agency’s surveillance programs through Glenn Greenwald of the British newspaper The Guardian. Unfortunately, virtually all supporters of these disclosures have framed this story in a manner that reflects the ruling-class perspective. This article identifies the political falsehoods in this framing and presents the contractionary view of surveillance. My comments are based on the analysis of capitalist power in chapter three of Contractionary Revolution. Please consult this book for details on the ideas presented. From various articles and videos featuring the editors of cooperating newspapers[1] it appears that the following is the standard interpretation of the NSA disclosures among sympathetic observers: Terrorism is a serious threat to the United States; The US government justifiably conducts surveillance to counter this threat; The need for surveillance must be balanced against Constitutional rights, which protect personal privacy and allow for political protests and investigative journalism; The boundary between surveillance and rights must be chosen by the populace; Surveillance within this boundary must be carefully regulated to prevent the unauthorized use of collected data. Although this interpretation has some commendable aspects, its central feature is a political fiction that destroys the real meaning of the disclosures. Briefly stated, **surveillance is** primarily **about political power, not security threats. Any story that revolves around threats while ignoring power is** both **false and misleading**. To grasp the deceptive nature of the standard interpretation **it is necessary to understand how power is exercised in a capitalist society, and how surveillance fits into this picture**. The key point regarding power is that the conventional claim about popular sovereignty is false. In its day-to-day operations a capitalist society is ruled not by the populace through its government, but by the capitalist class through its state. Contractionism calls this deception the democratic illusion. The two primary methods used to exercise power are legitimacy and coercion. **Legitimacy refers to voluntary support for capitalist rule**. It derives **from the system’s success in satisfying human desires and from the manipulation of public opinion. Coercion refers to the physical and psychological measures** used **to neutralize those who threaten**, or could potentially threaten, **the ruling class**. A critical problem for any ruling class is how to allocate its scarce resources to these two methods so as to its maximize social control. Assume, for example, that legitimacy could be strengthened by increasing the incomes of selected groups or by intensifying the propaganda delivered by the media. Which of these two techniques will be more effective under current conditions? **Coercion is** normally applied selectively, **so the most dangerous targets must be identified**. Which individual and groups are these at the present time? The role of **surveillance is to gather detailed information about the populace so** that **questions** such as these **can be reliably answered. Surveillance can thus be defined as the collection of information about the populace by the state for the purpose of maximizing social control at the lowest possible cost**. With this theoretical overview in place it is possible to critically evaluate the standard interpretation. **The** initial assertion – that **terrorism** seriously **threatens the US** – is a fabrication. This **claim** **relies heavily on the events of 9/11**, but numerous scientists, engineers, architects, and other **analysts have decisively refuted the official story**.[2] **The** 9/11 attacks were almost certainly a false-flag operation: a strike by internal actors that was blamed on external perpetrators. A **central purpose of this operation was to create a new enemy to replace the defunct communists, and a central purpose of this new enemy was to justify surveillance**. To see this clearly, imagine that communism had not been replaced, and that the NSA disclosures had therefore occurred in the absence of a terrifying foe. How would the massive surveillance have been explained? With the terrorism cover story in place, Snowden’s revelations could be ascribed to the over-zealous protection of national security. **Without this story, the US ruling class would have been scrambling for an appropriate rationale, and could now be facing a serious challenge to its dominance**. The puzzling question is why 9/11 occurred so late. The Soviet Union crumbled in the early 1990s, taking the communist threat with it. The US ruling class thus lacked a credible cover story, and was dangerously exposed, for almost a decade. Possibly it took that long for this class to formulate a workable alternative, or perhaps it judged that an immediate transition to the terrorist threat would arouse troublesome suspicions among the system’s critics. **The** second **assertion – that terrorism justifies government surveillance – is obviously false given the virtual absence of a terrorist threat**. The deception here is more subtle: that **it is the government and not the state that conducts surveillance**. This highlights a grievous error in political analysis, one made by progressives and conservatives alike. To explain, **government refers to the people’s elected representatives, who formally establish laws and policies but lack political power. The state, on the other hand, refers to the administrative structures that regulate a society’s operations in the interests of its ruling class.** As noted above, the state is where real power normally resides. In typical political discussions, government and state are conflated, either by referring to the state as “government agencies” or by assuming that the state faithfully obeys government dictates. **The state, however, is largely independent of government, and will disregard, destabilize, or even overthrow the latter if it persistently thwarts the capitalist will**. What makes this error truly egregious in the present context is that the state’s independent role has been repeatedly unmasked. Greenwald reminds us that almost nobody in the US government was even aware of the NSA’s existence for its first twenty years.[3] Today the situation is largely unchanged. When US Representative Keith Ellison was asked by George Stephanopoulos what he knew about the NSA programs, he answered, “Almost nothing.”[4] Chris Huhne, a former cabinet minister in the UK, admitted recently that neither the cabinet nor the national security council was informed about the comprehensive surveillance being carried out by Britain’s NSA equivalent, the GCHQ.[5] The supremacy of state over government has been revealed so frequently that a constant media effort is required to keep the fig leaf in place. Thus a New York Times editorial about the NSA disclosures repeatedly ascribed surveillance to the US government. One example, which includes the security canard for good measure: “**The issue is not whether the government should vigorously pursue terrorists. The question is whether the security goals can be achieved by less-intrusive or sweeping means, without trampling on democratic freedoms and basic rights**.”[6] Don’t be fooled by the authoritative source and liberal sentiments – **this is propaganda. The** last three **assertions** of the standard interpretation, like the second, **are based on the false premise of a serious terrorist threat**. To meaningfully address them I must therefore broaden my scope beyond capitalist surveillance, which is justified on this basis. Specifically, consider what will happen when contractionists achieve their revolutionary goal in a country like Canada and replace the capitalist class as society’s ruling group. Will a contractionary Canada conduct surveillance on its citizens? Yes, it will. Surveillance is not a capitalist invention, but an inescapable component of political power. In any society the ruling group has current or potential opponents who must be neutralized if power is to be maintained. To deny this is to deny the cold-blooded realities of the ruler-ruled relationship. In the contractionary context, assertions #3 and #5 are valuable principles that will undoubtedly be adopted in some form: **the need for surveillance will be balanced against fundamental rights, and the collected information will be stringently regulated to prevent unauthorized use**. Assertion #4, however, is a logical impossibility. The populace, which is being scrutinized, cannot choose the boundaries on this scrutiny. If this were permitted, the boundary could be set to zero surveillance, and power would dissolve. **The** actual **challenge for the populace is to struggle against** the boundaries set by **the ruling group** – that is, to **expand the range of democratic rights** through legal initiatives, protest rallies, and the like. It is also possible to utilize the fact that **this assertion entails** a logical contradiction. Whenever such a choice is offered by the ruling group, we can be sure that power is being mystified, that **the populace is being manipulated**. This is true today with respect to capitalist surveillance, and it will be true tomorrow if contractionary rulers concoct a similar story. Glenn Greenwald consistently dismisses terrorism as the real reason for surveillance, which means that he rejects the standard interpretation. However, his analysis remains well within the scope of mainstream politics. He does not question the official 9/11 story, he fully accepts the government-state conflation, and he offers only a vague account of capitalist power. Contractionists should therefore treat his journalism with caution. He is unquestionably a hero for his role in the NSA disclosures, but he should be seen as a courageous fighter for democratic rights, not as a political analyst who can help us achieve revolutionary change. Skepticism is also warranted when apparently radical analysts speak to us through the capitalist media. Seumus Milne, for example, is a Guardian columnist whose commentary frequently skirts the limits of permissible thought. In one of his columns he exploited the fact that NSA surveillance evidently has two subsidiary aims: diplomatic advantage for the US state and commercial advantage for US corporations. Milne distanced himself from the standard interpretation by rejecting terrorism as the surveillance rationale. In identifying the true rationale, however, he cited the subsidiary aims but ignored the central purpose of social control. In his words: “… much of what NSA and GCHQ (virtually one organisation) are up to has nothing to do with terrorism or security at all, but … the exercise of naked state power to gain political and economic advantage.” This might be called high-grade propaganda. It placates advanced progressives who have seen through the terrorism/security subterfuge, but it neglects the role of surveillance in maintaining the prevailing order. My suggested motto for Milne and those like him: “To the political brink, but never beyond”. Let me briefly address the significance of the disclosures and of the surveillance itself. The disclosures are important because they provide confirmation of widespread NSA surveillance and details on how it is being conducted. Opponents of intrusive surveillance are thus in a better position to defend democratic freedoms. The disclosures are also important because they have made the populace aware that they are being carefully monitored. To date this has not resulted in widespread outrage because capitalism’s control of the public mind is almost total and its legitimacy is therefore high. But things change, and contractionary movements will likely be able to use this expanded awareness in the future to shift legitimacy to themselves. The significance of the NSA surveillance itself is related to the fact that it is occurring as the biosphere is rapidly degrading and ecological collapse has become a frightening possibility. The aim of the contractionary movement is to initiate revolutions that will prevent this collapse. Pervasive surveillance by the NSA and similar agencies could retard or prevent these revolutions, and this is really what is at stake here. **As with other aspects of capitalist social control, surveillance must be aggressively resisted so that the expansionary present can be quickly transformed into the contractionary future. This momentous transition is humankind’s only chance to avoid an apocalyptic fate**.

## Turns Case – Contradictions

#### This turns case – Surveillance is a contradictory exercise of power because the watchers can’t be watched back. Kikendall 2k11:

Stacey Kikendall. The Power of Vision in Charles Dickens's "Dombey and Son.” The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 65-82 http://www.jstor.org/stable/23621445 SHSBR [Bracketed for gender]

To show how Dickens is grappling with community, fragmentation, and psychology through his use of vision, Dickens's frame of perspective can be conceptualized by referencing the Foucauldian claim that the disciplinary power of the panopticon abolishes "the crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together" and replaces it with "a collection of separated individuals" (Foucault 201). **The panopticon**, conceived by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century, generally **involves** a prison structure consisting of numerous individual cells surrounding **a central observation** tower that segregates prisoners into solitary cells, preventing them from interacting with one another. In addition, **the constant surveillance permitted by the panopticon allows the viewer to hold all the power, for the prisoner is always the observed and never the observer. Foucault** actually **describes visibility as a trap**, writing, **"Each individual**, in his place, is securely confined to a cell from which he is seen from the front by the supervisor; but the side walls prevent him from coming into contact with his companions. He **is seen, but** he **does not see; [t]he[y are]** is **the object of information, never a subject in communication"** (200). By describing visual power as a means to both isolate and discipline, Foucault is dealing with what Krasner terms the entangled, fragmented eye. However, Foucault also indicates that the observer position can be held by anyone: "Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine" (202). Foucault's description of the panopticon as an ideological apparatus has influenced a whole generation of Western criticism, and, rather against my will, I find myself agreeing that vision can be used as a disciplinary tactic and am intrigued by the idea that visual power can be held by anyone. On the other hand, I am skeptical of the total fragmentation of the crowd. Although still mediated through the omniscient narrator, Dickens's presentation of a variety of individual perspectives within his novel Dombey and Son fits with Foucault's and Krasner's delineation of fragmentation. However, these perspectives are inevitably influenced by the other characters' perspectives because of their communal and communicative existence within the world of the novel. As a result, I am more inclined to see the universe of Dombey and Son as J. Hillis Miller describes the universe of Our Mutual Friend,2 "not that of a non-Euclidean space filled with incommensurate local monads entirely isolated from one another. It is rather that of a large number of interlocking perspectives on the world" (291-92). Miller's idea seems to exist in some space between Foucault's binary of individuals/crowd, because he explains that "man is not detached. He is entwined with the world, and the world is permeated with his presence" (279). In this more permeable space, each character has his or her individual perspective but they are not isolated because other peoples' gazes are always influencing it and vice versa. In fact, for Dickens the gaze seems necessary to remain part of the human community.

## Turns Case – Laundry List

#### This turns case - There are a laundry list of problems with surveillance - mental health problems, distrust, conformity, and reduced authority. Chambers 2k13:

Chambers, Chris. [Professor of cognitive neuroscience at the school of psychology, Cardiff University] “NSA and GCHQ: the flawed psychology of government mass surveillance”. 26 August 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2013/aug/26/nsa-gchq-psychology-government-mass-surveillance Recent disclosures about the scope of government surveillance are staggering. We now know that the UK's Tempora program records huge volumes of private communications, including – as standard – our emails, social networking activity, internet histories, and telephone calls. Much of this data is then shared with the US National Security Agency, which operates its own (formerly) clandestine surveillance operation. Similar programs are believed to operate in Russia, China, India, and throughout several European countries. While pundits have argued vigorously about the merits and drawbacks of such programs, **the voice of science has remained** relatively **quiet**. This is **despite the fact that science**, alone, **can lay claim to a wealth of empirical evidence on the psychological effects of surveillance**. Studying that evidence leads to a clear conclusion and a warning: indiscriminate intelligence-gathering presents a grave risk to our mental health, productivity, social cohesion, and ultimately our future. **Surveillance impairs mental health** and performance. For more than 15 years we've known that **surveillance leads to heightened levels of stress, fatigue and anxiety**. In the workplace it also reduces performance and our sense of personal control. A government that engages in mass surveillance cannot claim to value the wellbeing or productivity of its citizens. **Surveillance promotes distrust** between the public and the state. People will trust an authority to the extent that it is seen to behave in their interest and trust them in return. **Research suggests that people tolerate limited surveillance provided they believe their security is being bought with someone else's liberty**. The moment **it becomes clear that they are** in fact **trading their own liberty**, the social contract is broken. **Violating this trust changes the definition of "us" and "them" in a way that can be dangerous for a democratic authority – suddenly, most of the population stands in opposition to their own government. Surveillance breeds conformity**. For more than 50 years we've known that surveillance encourages conformity to social norms. In a series of classic experiments during the 1950s, **psychologist Solomon Asch showed that conformity is so powerful that individuals will follow the crowd even when the crowd is obviously wrong**. A government that engages in mass surveillance cannot claim to value innovation, critical thinking, or originality. **Surveillance can** actually **undermine** the influence of **authority**. Security chiefs may believe that surveillance gives them greater control over the populace, but is this truly the case? The answer is complicated. **A recent study found that if members of a team felt a common social identity with their leader then surveillance in fact reduced the leader's influence by fostering resentment** and distrust. However, if they saw their leader as belonging to a social outgroup then surveillance increased the leader's power. This pattern is interesting because it places politicians and the security services at loggerheads. **For politicians to succeed in a democracy they must be seen as part of the same ingroup as their electorate**. We see this in force most strongly during election time, when politicians go to great pains to emphasise their grass roots connections with the community. **But by supporting mass surveillance, politicians then undermine this relationship**. The security services, on the other hand, have the opposite motivation. For them, mutual distrust is par for the course, so it is better to maintain a social distance from the public. That way they are guaranteed to be perceived as an outgroup, which – the evidence suggests – increases the influence they can wield through surveillance. There are two ways to resolve this conflict between the motivations of elected representatives and security services. One is to embrace totalitarianism, breaking all bonds of social identity between politicians and the electorate. In this (unpalatable) scenario, democracy converts to a police state in which all parts of government are seen by the populace as an outgroup. An alternative is to put an end to mass surveillance, forcing the security services to fall in line with the parts of government that value liberty. What seems clear is that the government can't moonlight as both an ingroup and an outgroup – it can't claim to serve the liberty of its citizens while in the same breath violating that liberty. If they achieve nothing else, the Snowden revelations throw this contradiction into sharp relief. Surveillance paves the way to a pedestrian future. As the world's governments march toward universal surveillance, their **ignorance of psychology is clear at every step. Even** in the 2009 House of Lords report "Surveillance: Citizens and the State" – **a document that is critical of surveillance** – not a single psychologist is interviewed and, **in 130 pages, not a single reference is made to decades of psychological research**. **We ignore this evidence at our peril. Psychology forewarns us** that a future of universal surveillance will be a world bereft of anything sufficiently interesting to spy on – a beige authoritarian landscape in which we lose the ability to relax, innovate, or take risks. A world in which the definition of "appropriate" thought and behaviour becomes so narrow that even the most pedantic norm violations are met with exclusion or punishment. A world in which we may even surrender our very last line of defence – the ability to look back and ask: Why did we do this to ourselves?

## Turns Case – Levinas

#### This turns case - Surveillance totalizes the Other and silences its voice. Introna 2k3:

Introna, professor of ethics, 3 – Professor of Organization, Technology, and Ethics at Lancaster University (Lucas, 2003, “Workplace Surveillance ‘is’ Unethical and Unfair,” Surveillance and Society, Volume 1, Number 2, pp. 210-216, http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/download/3354/3317) SHSBR

**Surveillance** in its operation **renders the Other faceless and speechless. The** very logic of **surveillance suggests the operation of power ‘at a distance’** — both **physically and institutionally**. In its rhetoric at least, it is the faceless collective through its representative (the manager, police officer, doctor) that is monitoring the individual. Moreover, in its operation surveillance is not just a general ‘staring’ at the world; **it is always with a purpose**, i.e**. to make some judgement** about the one being monitored. Its logic starts with a category and ends with a judgement relative to that category (productivity, criminality, clinical condition, etc.). But more, in the subsequent encounter (if it happens) the monitoring data, re-produces and legitimises, by its very nature, the currency of what is possible to bring up or not. The only legitimate exchange is in terms of the ‘facts’ (outcome of the monitoring process). Through this move the ‘otherness’ of the Other, the exceptional, is neatly bracketed and ‘covered over’. As such **the monitoring reveals the Other as “that which they really are”**— productive or not, performing or not, deserving or not? It seems that the ethical paradox of rendering the Other present through the monitoring data is that the possibility for speaking — encountering the Other — is exactly circumvented by the argument that it is ‘fair and just’ that all are rendered equal by the objectivity of the data, and treated only in terms of that. In this way the voice of the Other becomes silenced in the supposedly ‘just’ economy of the category and the rule. As such we (the violators) feel justified — we merely applied the rules to the facts presented, as any reasonable person would have done. **We may be reasonable, even fair, but are we ethical? No**, says Levinas, the ethical demands that we encounter the other as a face, to let the other explain him or herself, to let him or her speak, to allow them to question the validity of our judgements, again, and again and again. But where will it end? Nowhere, it is infinite, responds Levinas, nothing less, nothing more. Without this infinite responsibility ethics will lose its gravity. It is only in our being ‘hostage’ to the Other that the possibility of ethics exists. But this is just one part of the Levinasian ethics. If we step back from the unsettling gravity of the face we realise that every other is also a face to be encountered — indeed, multiplicities of faces surround us. Ethics is impossible. **For Levinas ethics** also **immediately and simultaneously include politics** — the “third” in his language. With the entry of the “third” the radical asymmetry of the ethical becomes mediated by the question of justice— the equality of all. The face of the Other obsesses me both in its refusal to be contained (rendered equal) and its recalling of the always already equal claim of all Others weighing down on me in this particular face before me. In the words of Critchley (1999: 226-7): Thus my ethical relation to the Other is an unequal, asymmetrical relation to a height that cannot be comprehended, but which, at the same time, opens onto a relation to the third and to humanity as a whole – that is, to a symmetrical communities of equals. This simultaneity of ethics and politics gives a doubling quality to all discourse…the community has a double structure; it is a community of equals which is at the same time based on the inegalitarian moment of the ethical relation. It is exactly this simultaneous presence of the Other and all other Others that gives birth to the question of justice. However, the urgency of justice is not an ‘equality in the law’ but an ‘equality before the law’ which is an urgency born out of the radical asymmetry of every ethical relation. Without such a prior radical asymmetry the claim of the Other can always in principle become determined and codified into a calculation. Thus, for Levinas, justice has its standard, its force, in proximity of the face of the Other. Levinas (1991(1974): 159) asserts: “justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest. The equality of all is born by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights. The forgetting of self moves justice”. In justice we are compelled to ‘compare the incomparable’. **In the practice of everyday institutional life we are continuously placed in a position where we need to make judgements about others or be judged ourselves. We need to do this in order to make decisions about** all sorts of **things necessary for institutions** and society **to function**. In the interest of justice we also need to develop rules (laws, regulations and guidelines) to ensure that all faces ‘speak’ equally, that there is “no distinction between those close and those far off” — especially those who cannot speak because the very structure of the economic system excluded them from the start. We are not only talking about the so-called ‘stakeholders’. The notion of stakeholder already presumes a political judgement of who is worthy of consideration and who not. In justice everybody is always already a ‘stakeholder’ equally deserving of consideration. Thus, we find ourselves in an impossible situation. We need the rules, the equal monitoring of all, in the interest of justice, yet when applying these to every particular instance (the singular here before me) we realise that we are comparing the incomparable. This employee is more (or less than) suggested by the data. These measurements or observations are just part of the picture — and not even the right part. In the face of each individual’s circumstances (the very singularity of the singular) the rules and measurements seems like a caricature, devoid of legitimacy. However, when we attempt to suspend the rule (start to make exceptions) we become acutely aware of the equally valid exceptional claim of every other Other, not here before us. Ethics and justice are impossible. Workplace surveillance is neither ethical nor fair. If we take Levinas’ impossible ethics and justice as our guide then we may quite rightly ask: “what does this mean for workplace surveillance practices?” Here are some suggestions: a. **In the interest of ethics we need to suspend the judgements implied by** the **monitoring** data, we need to walk the further mile to get the ‘whole’ picture. We need to treat as suspicious every possible judgement rendered by the data. We need to insist that the ‘monitored’ are allowed to speak, to explain themselves in their own terms. **We must remain open to the possibility that we probably will get it wrong**. b. **In the interest of justice we must compare and judge while remaining suspicious of every comparison**. We need to continue to allow the silent voices to speak. Who has become excluded in the comparison and why? c. Workplace surveillance is not a ‘solvable’ ethical problem. There is no ideal balance or compromise between ethics and justice. We will always get it wrong. There is no final moral argument or position that could settle it ‘once and for all’. This is not a defeat but rather the opening up of an ethical space for encountering the Other in our scrutiny, questioning and reflection. d. Finally, we need to accept that ethics and justice is frail and that we cannot give it force by reducing it to categories, reason and argument. These will fail, as they will become the very resources to be seized for the purpose of justification by the power-full against the power-less in the moment of judgement and decision, thereby violating the Other (ethics) as well as the ‘third’ (justice) not present.3 **One may respond** and suggest **that these demands are impossible. Yes, the ethics of surveillance is impossible and that is its force. It is this that will unsettle the certainty of our comparisons and judgements and then** maybe, just maybe, **ethics will happen**. I am suggesting, with Levinas, that the working out of ethics and justice in everyday workplace surveillance practices starts by accepting that they are unethical and unfair, from the start, as such. It is exactly with such radical position that its possibility begins rather than ends.

## Turns Case – Hypermasculinity

#### This turns case - Surveillance is hypermasculine *penetration* of peoples’ privacy. Taylor 2k6:

Taylor, Chloi. "Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida." Postmodern Culture. University of Toronto, 2006. <http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.106/16.2hipsky.txt>. SHSBR [Brackets and ellipses in original]

Because the face, for Levinas, at least on the most obvious reading, is not seen, and the face-to-face encounter occurs otherwise than through the gaze, it is immediately appropriate that Derrida would see the blindman as an ethical figure, for all of the blindman's encounters with others must occur without seeing their form. In Specters of Marx and Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida considers positions of blindness in terms that, for Levinas, describe ethical relations. A particular form of blindness described in Specters of Marx and Echographies of television is the "visor effect," the situation in which "we do not see who looks at us" (Specters 7). For Derrida, the most dramatic example of such a scenerio of a-reciprocal vision occurs in hauntings: **The specter** is not simply this visible invisible that I can see, it **is someone who watches** or concerns **me without any possible reciprocity, and** who therefore **makes the law when I am blind**, blind by situation. **The specter enjoys the right of** absolute inspection. He is the right of inspection itself. (Echographies 137 [121]) The "right of inspection" ("/droit de regard/") is described earlier in Echographies as "the right to control and **surveillance**" (42 [34]). **This right to** see, control, and **survey is evoked as a** specifically **masculine form of power**: "**the right to /penetrate/ a 'public' or 'private' space, the right to 'introduce'** the eye and all these **optical prostheses** . . . into the 'home' of the other [/il s'agisse du droit de pinitrer dans un espace 'public' ou 'privi', d'y faire 'entrer,' dans le 'chez-soi' de l'autre/]" (Echographies 42 [34]). **This phallic vision infiltrates** into the intimate spaces of others either **through the use of** the eye itself or through **prosthetic devices such as surveillance cameras**, and, as shall be seen, Derrida describes the feminized, blind, and a-reciprocal submission to this masculine gaze in ethical terms.

#### Dominance is expressed through norms which shape politics. Harris 89:

(Adrienne, Ph.D. 1972, University of Michigan, Studies In Gender and Sexuality, Rocking the Ship of State. Pg 155, Harris)

**My** second **objective goes beyond** describing and **understanding this discourse**. Stated in the strongest possible terms, I wish to render this discourse "impotent and obsolete" (to borrow a phrase from Ronald Reagan). **I wish to expose** its limits and distortions, its underlying **assumptions and values, and** the vast **gaps between what it claims to do and what it actually does**, so as to **break its stranglehold on our scholarship**, our **policy decisions**, our national **political processes, and** our **imaginations**. I wish to examine and unravel the methods, procedures; and claims that constitute this kind of thinking and thus expose the ways in which a discourse that claims to be rational, objective, realistic, and universal is, in fact, anything but. My third objective is to foster the development of more truly realistic, effective, and humane ways of thinking about international security and cooperation. I see the deconstruction and delegitimation of technostrategic discourse as a necessary, a not sufficient, condition for this project. A crucial step is the juxtaposition of ways of thinking from other disciplines, other political traditions, and other cultures, as well as ways of thinking that arise arise from the experience of nondominant groups within this culture. My goal is not to put forth a fully developed and unified policy alternative but rather to open some new space and make some new connections. Contemporary **feminist theory is an invaluable tool** in this project, especially that strain of feminist theory that takes as its object of scrutiny discourses produced by men. This kind of feminist work aims to explore the discourses' underlying assumptions, methods, procedures, and techniques of theory, development, their use of criteria and methods of inclusion and exclusion; and the ways in which these discourses work and how they exert their dominance. This work is a method, a strategy, whose goal is to destabilize, delegitimize, and dismantle patriarchal discourses--to render their systems, methods, and resumptions unable to retain their dominance and power and thus to open spaces for other voices to be heard. **Destabilizing and interrupting patriarchal discourse are seen as the prerequisites for establishing in new paradigms and different theoretical tools and for creating systems of knowledge based on different values and interests**.

## Turns Case – Soft Power

#### This turns case – Domestic surveillance kills soft power – it makes the US seem hypocritical just like Jim Crow did as a glaring contradiction in values. Even allies vocally dislike it, and the disapproval of surveillance by the American public is why. Arkedis 2k13:

Jim Arkedis. [senior fellow at the Progressive Policy Institute, former Department of Defense intelligence analyst] “PRISM Is Bad for American Soft Power”. The Atlantic. 19 June 2013. Accessed 22 December 2015. Web. SHSBR http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/prism-is-bad-for-american-soft-power/277015/

In 1948, Harry **Truman flip-flopped**. After decades of holding racial biases, he decided **to support** the **civil rights** movement against Jim Crow laws. **Truman's shift was** as much **cold political calculation** as anything else. The path to 270 electoral college votes ran through northern cities with large African American populations and a few states in the Deep South. The strategy worked. He carried Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas just as the Chicago Daily Tribune went to press with "Dewey Defeats Truman." There was a foreign policy angle to Truman's civil rights awakening, too. In the ideological battle pitting democracy against communism, **the Soviet Union began to churn out propaganda saying that Jim Crow proved America's inability to live up to its own fundamental values** on human rights. The argument was effective, argues Caley Robertson of Colby University: segregation was frustrating the United States' attempts to export democracy during the Cold War. In other words, **Jim Crow was damaging** America's **soft power**, defined by Harvard professor Joseph Nye as a country's ability to achieve its aims through attraction rather than coercion. Which brings us to PRISM, the NSA program that collects meta-data from Americans' telephone and online communications. I am a former Department of Defense intelligence analyst. I have never used PRISM, and do not know if it existed during my tenure. However, I have used NSA databases, and became aware of two ironclad truths about the agency: First, its data is a critical intelligence tool; and second, that access to databases by non-NSA intelligence analysts is highly controlled. It's like buying drugs (so I'm told): you need "a guy" on the inside who passes you the goods in the shadows, then disavows any connection to you. In addition to being useful and tightly controlled, PRISM is, of course, legal by the letter of the law. Its existence is primarily justified by the "business records" clause in the PATRIOT Act, and President Obama has argued that the legislation has been authorized by "bipartisan majorities repeatedly," and that "it's important to understand your duly elected representatives have been consistently informed on exactly what we're doing." Salvation from excessive government snooping would seem to lie at the ballot box. Fair enough. But **in the immediate wake of September 11, Americans questioned little of what their government would do to keep them safe. Just four months after the attacks in January 2002, Gallup reported that fully half of Americans would support anti-terrorism measures even if they violated civil liberties. Times have changed**. As soon as August 2003, Gallup found **just 29 percent of Americans were willing to sacrifice civil liberties for security**. By 2009, a CBS poll concluded only 41 percent of Americans had even heard or read about the PATRIOT Act, and 45 percent of those believed the law endangered their civil liberties. A Washington Post poll from April 2013--after the Boston marathon attacks but before PRISM's disclosure-- found 48 percent of Americans feared the government would go too far in compromising constitutional rights to investigate terrorism. And following the Edward Snowden leaks, 58 percent were against the government collecting phone records. Not a total reversal, but certainly trending in one direction. This shift has existed in a vacuum of public debate. Prior to the PRISM leaks, the last time domestic government surveillance made headlines was in very late 2005 and early 2006, following revelations that the Bush administration was wiretapping Americans without a warrant. Despite the scandal, the PATRIOT Act was quickly reauthorized by March 2006. The Bush administration did announce the end of warrantless wiretapping in 2007, and he moved the program under jurisdiction of the FISA court , a panel of Supreme Court-appointed judges who approve domestic surveillance requests. To call the FISA court a rubber stamp is an understatement. This year, it has rejected a grand total of 11 warrant requests out of--wait for it--33,996 applications since the Carter administration. The PATRIOT Act's reauthorization wouldn't come up again until 2009. By then, public uproar over warrantless wiretapping had long since receded, and the year's debate played out as a relatively quite inside-baseball scuffle between civil liberties groups and the Hill. When the law came up for its next presidential signature in 2011, it was done quietly by autopen--a device that imitates Obama's John Hancock--from France. Shifting attitudes and quiet reauthorization flies in the face of the standard the president has set for himself. In a 2009 speech at the National Archives, Obama emphasized the importance of the consent of the governed in security affairs, "I believe with every fiber of my being that in the long run we cannot keep this country safe unless we enlist the power of our most fundamental values... My administration will make all information available to the American people so that they can make informed judgments and hold us accountable." The president's inability to live up to this ideal is particularly jarring as he defends PRISM. Following the leaks, he's said he is pushing the intelligence community to release what it can, and rightly insists that the NSA is not listening in on Americans' phone calls. Those are helpful steps, but should have been raised during the National Archives speech just months into his administration, not six months into his second term. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper continues to argue that disclosure of collection methods will give America's enemies a "'playbook' to avoid detection." That's thin gruel. First, America's enemies are already aware of the NSA's extensive electronic surveillance capabilities. That's why Osama Bin Laden and deceased al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi used a complex network of couriers rather than electronic communications. It's typical operational security of truly dangerous operatives. Second, Obama stated as recently as late May that the threat from al Qaeda's core operatives has decreased significantly, shifting to less deadly cells scattered throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The lack of public debate, shifting attitudes towards civil liberties, insufficient disclosure, and a decreasing terrorist threat demands that collecting Americans' phone and Internet records must meet the absolute highest bar of public consent. It's a test the Obama administration is failing. This brings us back to Harry Truman and Jim Crow. Even though PRISM is technically legal, the lack of recent public debate and support for aggressive domestic collection is hurting America's soft power. The evidence is rolling in. **The China Daily**, an English-language mouthpiece for the Communist Party, **is having a field day, pointing out America's hypocrisy as the Soviet Union did with Jim Crow**. Chinese dissident artist Ai Wei Wei made the link explicitly, saying "In the Soviet Union before, in China today, and even in the U.S., officials always think what they do is necessary... but the lesson that people should learn from history is the need to limit state power." **Even America's allies are uneasy**, at best. German Chancellor Angela **Merkel grew up in the East German police state** and expressed diplomatic "surprise" at the NSA's activities. She vowed to raise the issue with Obama at this week's G8 meetings. **The Italian data protection commissioner said the program would "not be legal**" in his country. **British Foreign Minister William Hague came under fire in Parliament for his government's participation. If Americans supported these programs, our adversaries and allies would have no argument**. As it is, the next time the United States asks others for help in tracking terrorists, it's more likely than not that **they will question Washington's motives**.

#### Also, double-bind. Either (a) soft power is primarily effected by what the government does, in which case this would outweigh the aff on strength of link because the aff is just about the *behavior* of gun owners making the US look bad, or (b) soft power is not primarily effected by what the government does, in which case it’d be unlikely that a handgun ban can outweigh everything else wrong with the US in the eyes of other countries.

## Turns Case – Militarism

#### This turns case - Surveillance ignites and enforces the militarized culture of the US. Boghosian 2k13.

Boghosian, Heidi. "Freedom Cannot Exist Alongside a Massive Surveillance Industrial Complex: They Are Incompatible." Thruthout. Thruth-out.org, 23 Aug. 2013. Web. 2 Feb. 2016. <http://www.truth-out.org/progressivepicks/item/18356-freedom-cannot-exist-alongside-a-massive-surveillance-industrial-complex-they-are-incompatible>.

Heidi Boghosian is the former executive director of the National Lawyers Guild, a progressive bar association established in 1937. She co-hosts the weekly civil liberties radio program, "Law and Disorder," which airs on Pacifica's WBAI in New York and on 60 national affiliate stations around the country. Her book reviews have been published in The Federal Lawyer and the New York Law Journal. She received her JD from Temple Law School where she was editor-in-chief of the Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review. She also holds an MS from Boston University College of Communication and a BA from Brown University. She is admitted to practice law in Connecticut, New York, the Southern District of New York and the US Supreme Court.

This convergence of government and business intelligence operations has created all the elements of an Orwellian mass **surveillance network: a trusting and fearful public, a shift to preemptive policing justified by opportunistic citing of a nebulous enemy threat, domestic use of military equipment**, and communications devices that provide direct portals into private transactions. Each component element is formidable. **Together**, **they are a nightmare** for democracy. Normalizing Cultural Obedience through Surveillance Every day you leave your home, your image is caught on surveillance cameras at least two hundred times, it is estimated. Little public debate has addressed the possible consequences of nearly continuous surveillance. **Cameras monitor us while we shop, ride elevators, tour museums, stand in line at banks, use ATMs, or merely walk down streets, desensitizing us to unceasing observation and recording. People growing up in the digital age may have a hard time imagining life without the self-consciousness and self-censorship prompted by today’s surveillance state.** Others may recall a time when the nation expressed outrage when its citizens were “bugged,” trailed, or tracked. Today, only those living off the grid in rural areas of places such as Montana or Alaska are exempt from being monitored all the time. If they are determined to be “persons of interest,” however, they too can be tracked down and monitored. A new generation of advertisement-driven Americans is persuaded from an early age to buy cell phones, tablets, and computers with built-in monitoring capability. Disney and McDonald’s, along with many other corporations, lure children into online worlds or amusement parks where personal information is collected in exchange for special rewards. At the same time, policymakers, quick to approve sweeping counterterrorism measures, have dismantled many levels of legal safeguards that evolved over time to protect individuals’ civil liberties. Normalization is the process by which we accept and take for granted ideas and actions that previously may have been considered shocking or taboo. Michel Foucault wrote that modern control over society may be accomplished by watching its members, and maintaining routine information about them. Foucault emphasized that Jeremy Bentham’s eighteenth-century panopticon, a continuous **surveillance** model for prisoners who could not tell if they were being watched, exemplified an institution capable of producing what he called “docile bodies.” Distracted by the rush and convenience of information technology, few of us discern that opening a window into our personal transactions **helps shape a culture of** conformity and normalizes the nefarious business of **domestic** intelligence gathering. **Military Applications** Turn Homeward **Spying** on democracy **at home is seamlessly connected to military intelligence** and intervention abroad. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and intelligence coordinating entities known as fusion centers encourages collaboration between branches of the United States military, a host of government agencies, and profit-seeking corporations in collecting, storing, and acting on information about citizens. Weapons of war used for national defense abroad are now being deployed against people at home. **Military hardware such as drones, originally intended for tracking** and killing enemy combatants in the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, **are now used on U.S. soil**. Seeking to avoid revenue loss from reduced military contracts, electronics and computer companies have expanded into new markets with equipment originally developed for military use. Although better known for calculators and other consumer electronics, companies such as Texas Instruments started out by selling computer and surveillance systems to governments. **Increased** sophistication of **surveillance**, identification, and networking technology (including ID cards, radio-frequency identification chips, data matching, biometrics, and various other systems) **began to be used**—**for** efficiency’s sake—on such groups as immigrants, **military personnel**, and convicted offenders. Gradually they came to be employed more widely, often under pressure from manufacturers and their lobbyists, making it easier to conduct routine and widespread surveillance of broad segments of the population. **As military equipment is repurposed for domestic uses, more** and more **civilians are being classified as threats to national security**. Domestic dissenters are no longer labeled “subversive” as they were in the 1970s. Now they are “terrorist” threats. Police used to photograph and videotape activists. Now they operate “Domain Awareness Systems” and roll “SkyWatch” mobile surveillance towers to public spaces on a daily basis. One such tower was used to monitor the Occupy movement’s activities in New York’s Zuccotti Park and remains a permanent fixture there, keeping tabs on those who come to the park to sit, talk, play, organize, and engage in free speech. Over a decade after the 9/11 attacks, the government’s methods for securing freedom are informed by little, if any, public debate about the consequences. **Perpetual war**, paid for on a credit card, **threatens national security** through economic debt and instability, thinning the lifeblood of democracy **through the increasing intrusion of a surveillance state**.

#### That outweighs – the government mobilizes military culture against *all* Americans – the AC is just about the people hurting each other with militarism, not the government.

## Turns Case – Virtues

#### This turns case – Surveillance chills the ability to attain virtues such as trust, and leads to the development of vices such as resentment of others. Chambers 2k13:

Chambers, Chris. [Professor of cognitive neuroscience at the school of psychology, Cardiff University] “NSA and GCHQ: the flawed psychology of government mass surveillance”. 26 August 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/science/head-quarters/2013/aug/26/nsa-gchq-psychology-government-mass-surveillance SHSBRCG

Recent disclosures about the scope of government surveillance are staggering. We now know that the UK's Tempora program records huge volumes of private communications, including – as standard – our emails, social networking activity, internet histories, and telephone calls. Much of this data is then shared with the US National Security Agency, which operates its own (formerly) clandestine surveillance operation. Similar programs are believed to operate in Russia, China, India, and throughout several European countries. While pundits have argued vigorously about the merits and drawbacks of such programs, **the voice of science has remained** relatively **quiet**. This is **despite the fact that science**, alone, **can lay claim to a wealth of empirical evidence on the psychological effects of surveillance**. Studying that evidence leads to a clear conclusion and a warning: indiscriminate intelligence-gathering presents a grave risk to our mental health, productivity, social cohesion, and ultimately our future. **Surveillance impairs mental health** and performance. For more than 15 years we've known that **surveillance leads to heightened levels of stress, fatigue and anxiety**. In the workplace it also reduces performance and our sense of personal control. A government that engages in mass surveillance cannot claim to value the wellbeing or productivity of its citizens. **Surveillance promotes distrust** between the public and the state. People will trust an authority to the extent that it is seen to behave in their interest and trust them in return. **Research suggests that people tolerate limited surveillance provided they believe their security is being bought with someone else's liberty**. The moment **it becomes clear that they are** in fact **trading their own liberty**, the social contract is broken. **Violating this trust changes the definition of "us" and "them" in a way that can be dangerous for a democratic authority – suddenly, most of the population stands in opposition to their own government. Surveillance breeds conformity**. For more than 50 years we've known that surveillance encourages conformity to social norms. In a series of classic experiments during the 1950s, **psychologist Solomon Asch showed that conformity is so powerful that individuals will follow the crowd even when the crowd is obviously wrong**. A government that engages in mass surveillance cannot claim to value innovation, critical thinking, or originality. **Surveillance can** actually **undermine** the influence of **authority**. Security chiefs may believe that surveillance gives them greater control over the populace, but is this truly the case? The answer is complicated. **A recent study found that if members of a team felt a common social identity with their leader then surveillance in fact reduced the leader's influence by fostering resentment** and distrust. However, if they saw their leader as belonging to a social outgroup then surveillance increased the leader's power. This pattern is interesting because it places politicians and the security services at loggerheads. **For politicians to succeed in a democracy they must be seen as part of the same ingroup as their electorate**. We see this in force most strongly during election time, when politicians go to great pains to emphasise their grass roots connections with the community. **But by supporting mass surveillance, politicians then undermine this relationship**. The security services, on the other hand, have the opposite motivation. For them, mutual distrust is par for the course, so it is better to maintain a social distance from the public. That way they are guaranteed to be perceived as an outgroup, which – the evidence suggests – increases the influence they can wield through surveillance. There are two ways to resolve this conflict between the motivations of elected representatives and security services. One is to embrace totalitarianism, breaking all bonds of social identity between politicians and the electorate. In this (unpalatable) scenario, democracy converts to a police state in which all parts of government are seen by the populace as an outgroup. An alternative is to put an end to mass surveillance, forcing the security services to fall in line with the parts of government that value liberty. What seems clear is that the government can't moonlight as both an ingroup and an outgroup – it can't claim to serve the liberty of its citizens while in the same breath violating that liberty. If they achieve nothing else, the Snowden revelations throw this contradiction into sharp relief. Surveillance paves the way to a pedestrian future. As the world's governments march toward universal surveillance, their **ignorance of psychology is clear at every step. Even** in the 2009 House of Lords report "Surveillance: Citizens and the State" – **a document that is critical of surveillance** – not a single psychologist is interviewed and, **in 130 pages, not a single reference is made to decades of psychological research**. **We ignore this evidence at our peril. Psychology forewarns us** that a future of universal surveillance will be a world bereft of anything sufficiently interesting to spy on – a beige authoritarian landscape in which we lose the ability to relax, innovate, or take risks. A world in which the definition of "appropriate" thought and behaviour becomes so narrow that even the most pedantic norm violations are met with exclusion or punishment. A world in which we may even surrender our very last line of defence – the ability to look back and ask: Why did we do this to ourselves?

# \*\*\*NR Section\*\*\*

## AT: No Link

#### Even if federal surveillance isn’t normal means, local surveillance is. Intrusion into people’s privacy by police departments *is* a normal means component of banning handguns. Jacobs 2k2:

James B. Jacobs, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Professor of Constitutional Law and the Courts Director, Center for Research in Crime and Justice @ NYU Law, “Can Gun Control Work?” 2002. Can Gun Control Work?James B. Jacobs OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

**Who would enforce handgun disarmament** and with what degree of vigor**? N**ational **A**lcohol **P**rohibition **was enforced by a small number of US. Treasury Department agents and by** state and local **police departments**. Criminal justice and organized crime scholar Humbert S. Nelli writes that “Prohibition overburdened the criminal justice system and undermined respect for the nation’s law.” Another author recalled that “organization and methods . . . were hopelessly inadequate.”20 Professor McBain of Co- lumbia Law School wrote in 1928 that “the large-liquor drinking public has been indifferent to, if not positively in favor of, the corruption that helps to keep the stimulating stream flowing without interruption . . . the police force from the beginning has been thoroughly spoils-ridden.”21 In many cities, the police were contemptuous of alcohol prohibition and did not enforce it; corruption flourished. History has repeated itself with the contemporary drug war. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Printz, rejecting federal authority to order state and local officials to conduct background checks, **National Handgun Prohibition might have to be a completely federal program**.22 What kind of a federal enforcement agency would be needed to investigate and deter unlawful handgun possession? Currently, **most illegal handguns are seized as a consequence of street or car stops made by local law en- forcement agents; a frisk reveals the gun**.23 Routine car and street stops are not the province of federal agents, who lack general street-level policing authority and experience. Perhaps BATF could be expanded into a super nationwide street-level police agency with tens of thousands of new agents? Such a move would have to overcome the opposition of the NRA, gun owners, some members of Congress, and others who excoriate BATF agents as “jack-booted minions.”\* It would also have to overcome those who oppose expanding federal power and expending a great deal of federal funds. Undoubtedly, there would be opposition and resistance from fringe elements, who for years have warned of a colossal and despotic federal government. The number of militia groups would probably grow, with the potential for Waco-type standoffs and shootouts.24